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The field of International Relations has long been concerned with how the unequal concentration 
of material power shapes the patterns and prospects of global governance (Foot et al. 2003; 
Ikenberry 2011; Ikenberry et al. 2011).1 Amongst this diverse literature, however, less attention 
has been given to the similarly important issue of how the international community should 
address resistance from the United States and other great powers2 to new governance initiatives 
(Price 2004b). Yet in the fields of security (bans on antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions), 
human rights (creation of a permanent International Criminal Court), and the environment 
(implementation mechanism for the Kyoto Protocol) coalitions of middle power states and their 
transnational civil society allies3 have successfully negotiated binding multilateral rules that were 
more stringent than the United States and others like China, India, and Russia were willing to 
accept (Price 1998; Brem and Stiles 2009; Fehl 2012). These instances of “non-great power” law 
making are interesting because they reflect a deliberate effort on the part of less materially 
powerful actors to use multilateral institutions to generate new standards of appropriate 
behaviour – in effect, to employ law to create social facts that could prospectively bear on all 
states regardless of their formal endorsement of the treaty. The decision to proceed without the 
great powers was thus the product of a calculation that global norms can be more effectively 
achieved via strong legal rules with incomplete membership that may be expanded over time, 
rather than by weaker agreements that from the outset include all of the allegedly most vital 
actors. Supporters of more rigorous treaties thus created ad-hoc diplomatic fora intended to blunt 
the traditional dominance of leading states and pushed ahead with negotiations even once it was 
clear that these actors would not support the resulting institutions.  
This strategy poses an important puzzle for theories of IR, since it is widely held that 
successful global governance efforts must be directed by, or at least encompass, the most 
materially powerful states in the international system. A range of theories—especially realist and 
institutionalist variants—have assumed that predominant powers posses the military, economic, 
and diplomatic resources to manage and enforce international cooperation (Krasner 1976; 
Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Thompson 2006; de Nevers 2007). Critics therefore regarded 
efforts at law making without the great powers as politically naïve and likely to lead to weak 
institutions that would be unable to effectively address governance challenges; more seriously, 
by excluding key actors, these institutions could actually lead to worse outcomes than in the 
previous status quo (Morgan 2002; Goldsmith 2003). This raises an important question 
  
concerning whether treaties can instantiate new international social standards—evidenced by 
changes in actor behaviour—when they fail to correspond to the wishes of the most powerful 
states. In other words, how (if at all) can non-great power law be said to matter, given its 
apparent limitations?  
This article addresses the consequences of pursuing global institutions without the great 
powers in both theoretical and empirical terms. I first build on recent constructivist accounts of 
international law to explain how formal multilateral treaties may serve as effective instruments 
for the promotion of new norms in the absence of great power leadership (Reus-Smit 2003, 
2004a; Brunnée and Toope 2010). International law is an especially authoritative means for 
organizing international affairs and generating meaning because “law now provides in large part 
the vocabulary for contemporary politics.” (Kratochwil 2014:1) Institutions are also embedded 
within a broader web of principles, norms, and rules that structure the international system and 
inform the development of more particular practices. International law is thus both situated 
within and contributes to processes of social construction in the international system by 
constituting actors and defining the boundaries of (un)acceptable action. This “nested” quality of 
law further explains how particular treaties may succeed without recourse to forms of 
enforcement emphasized in the extant literature.  
My particular interest is not with the initial negotiation of multilateral institutions—a 
subject that has been well addressed already—but rather with their subsequent impact in shifting 
international expectations and resulting policies. I show that treaty proponents can build 
efficacious international legal institutions by harnessing the social power of law with respect to 
two distinct constituencies of state actors. First, because international legal obligation derives 
from the internal practices of law rather than external forms of coercion or instrumental 
advantages, treaties may generate communities of legal commitment among their members in the 
absence of agency from predominant actors. Second, treaties are tied to the wider universe of 
international legal and social practice, and for this reason may generate informal compliance and 
adaptation among non-party states even as these actors remain outside the formal legal 
agreement. In both respects, my account challenges sceptical assumptions regarding the 
prospective influence of institutions by refocusing attention away from law as constraint in 
favour of an emphasis on how treaties may generate changes in conceptions of appropriate 
action. The creation of institutions to counter the policy goals of dominant actors and promote 
 alternative standards of behaviour is thus a key way that less materially powerful states can 
influence global politics.  
To unpack these effects, I examine an archetypal non-great power institution, the 1997 
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Important scholarly accounts have documented how the 
ban on antipersonnel (AP) mines emerged and was codified (Cameron et al. 1998; Price 1998), 
yet there has been less sustained consideration of whether and how the treaty has generated 
observable policy change as evidence of a strengthening global norm (Price 2004a; Herby and 
Lawand 2008; Bower and Price 2013). The mine ban also constitutes a hard case for 
international norm change since it aims to eliminate a weapon that was in widespread 
contemporary use—thus intervening in the security affairs of the state where rigorous obligations 
are thought to be least efficacious—without the enforcement capacity provided by the most 
powerful states. This is ultimately a structural account of legal impact that aims to provide an 
overview of global incorporation of mine ban norm. As a consequence, the present study does 
not delve deeply into mechanisms of socialization at the level of individual states, bureaucracies, 
or human beings, preferring instead to highlight patterns of adaptation and change across the 
international system. I do, however, briefly identify some key domestic processes, and reflect 
further on these in final section of the article. The focus on a single treaty case also naturally 
limits the explanatory breadth, though the trade-off in terms of empirical detail is warranted in 
my view. Indeed, evaluating state change under these challenging conditions offers the chance to 
develop rich data as a first step in addressing the conditions under which non-great power law 
making may be appropriate. In the conclusion, I outline a research agenda that builds on insights 
from the present study to better understand both the promise and perils of pursuing international 
legal rules and norms without the great powers.   
 
THE ASSUMPTION OF GREAT POWER LEADERSHIP 
 
The notion that the international system requires concerted management from a power or powers 
has a long pedigree in the academic study of international relations and resonates with a popular 
view of international politics. Prominent theories of IR thus expect that dominant states will 
leverage their material and diplomatic advantages to exert disproportionate influence over 
governance by deploying coercive threats and sanctions (Thompson 2006; de Nevers 2007), 
  
providing collective goods (Krasner 1976; Norrlof 2010), and promoting particular conceptions 
of appropriate behaviour (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Fordham and Asal 2007). Scholars have 
therefore emphasized US agency in underwriting the post-World War II liberal international 
order and its continuing leadership in areas as diverse as arms control, environmental protection, 
and global finance and trade (Foot et al. 2003; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry 2011). 
More recently, the rise of the so-called “BRICS” countries has generated extensive debate 
concerning the existence, nature and extent of a shift in the global balance of power to 
encompass new great powers, and what this may mean for the future of global governance 
(Hurrell 2006; Destradi 2010). The coincidence of political power and governance comes at a 
price, however, as great powers frequently use their predominant status to entrench unequal 
rights and responsibilities in international law (Krisch 2005). As a consequence, the international 
community often incorporates a variety of concessions to great power demands, limiting the 
scope of legally binding rules to facilitate their participation in institutions. Yet in other instances 
the great powers—most especially the United States—have publicly rejected new international 
governance initiatives, presenting scholars and policymakers with a challenge concerning how to 
respond to intransigence in negotiations (Price 2004b).  
On its face, the decision to proceed without the support of the great powers would seem 
unlikely to lead to broadly effective international institutions because it runs counter to the most 
common view of the sources of legal obligation and institutional efficacy. Rationalist IR 
theories—broadly encompassing realist and institutionalist approaches—presume states are self-
interested, utility-maximizing actors that resort to cooperation only when it is valuable either in 
providing an additional means of exerting control in the international system (Mearsheimer 
1994; Glennon 2001), or in facilitating mutual gain through collective action (Koremenos 2013). 
These theories also adopt a positivist view of legal obligation in which commitments may only 
accrue via voluntary consent. International law is thus regarded as a set of agreed constraints 
designed to address previously established cooperation challenges; processes of legal creation 
are a response to and reflection of existing goals and interests, rather than a source of new 
conceptions concerning appropriate actors or action in their own right (Abbott et al. 2000; 
Koremenos et al. 2001; Guzman 2008). While institutionalist scholars do acknowledge that 
engagement within institutional structures will change preferences over time—especially by 
 altering calculations of self-interest with respect to material pay-offs, reputation and the like—
these interactions leave underlying identities unaltered. 
An assessment of the prospects for non-great power law must therefore confront two 
more particular theoretical challenges. First, the autonomous power of such treaties is assumed to 
be proscribed by the voluntary nature of law. Von Stein (2005) has argued that since states self-
select into joining treaties, this screening effect dramatically reduces the independent impact on 
subsequent behaviour that can be attributed to institutions. Treaties are thus expected to offer 
only a weak constraint on the practice of those states that do accept their dictates, since “most 
treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the 
absence of an agreement,” (Downs et al. 1996:380). Moreover, treaties cannot formally bind 
non-parties and should consequently have little if any influence over the behaviour of third 
states. This is especially true for powerful states that possess the material and diplomatic 
resources to resist outside pressures (Glennon 2001; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). 
 Second, such institutions fail to encompass dominant political actors with the greatest 
resources to facilitate cooperation. This is a problem because rationalist theories regard 
compliance as emanating from the ability of an institution to ensure a more or less consistent 
stream of goods—order or more diffuse gains from collective action—rather than an “internal” 
sense of obligation owing to the social legitimacy of the law (Reus-Smit 2003). Both realist and 
institutionalist accounts thus assume that agreements require some form of (often decentralized) 
monitoring and enforcement to deter cheating and maintain the smooth operation of transactions 
(Abbott et al. 2000:402–403, 418; Guzman 2008; Thompson 2009). The absence of key powers 
that might otherwise provide these functions is compounded by the fact that many regimes lack 
formal institutional enforcement provisions. Treaties concluded without great power support 
should therefore be particularly ineffectual since they will only ratify the existing goals of less 
important actors and thereby leave out the vital constituency of states that is allegedly most 
consequential to a treaty’s subsequent implementation.  
 
LAW AND NORMS WITHOUT THE GREAT POWERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
Nested Social Structures and the Power of Law 
 
  
Adopting insights from recent constructivist accounts can help to address the challenges noted 
above (Finnemore and Toope 2001; Reus-Smit 2003, 2004a; Brunnée and Toope 2010). For 
constructivists, international law is not defined by a set of formally promulgated binding rules 
backed by some means of enforcement—as per rationalist approaches—but rather by a particular 
mode of reasoned interaction based in precedent that generates categories of meaning and more 
specific permissive and prohibitionary standards. International law’s essence is rooted in a 
principled justificatory discourse in which actors debate the content, scope, and application of 
rules, in reference to previously articulated norms and procedures. These repertoires of ideas, 
behaviours, and language aggregate over time as precedents that structure international legal 
practice. In this sense, international law can be conceived as both a vocabulary and grammar for 
articulating forms of acceptable and unacceptable action in the international system: it provides a 
language for describing certain types of activities in relation to existing law—as “legal” or 
“illegal”—and defining criteria by which ideas and actions may be presented – in effect, 
“tell[ing] us which constructions are permissible.” (Borgen 2009:2) 
Law is not only a collection of procedures and rules that serve to regulate and constrain, 
therefore, but is itself a fundamental means by which social life is created and re-created 
(Finnemore and Toope 2001:745–746). The manner in which in which this occurs is of key 
importance for the theoretical potential of law to transcend dominant configurations of material 
power to promote genuinely global standards of appropriate behaviour. A central insight of 
recent constructivist work is that “legal practices are embedded within, and constituted by, layers 
of nested social understandings.” (Reus-Smit 2011:344) Particular legal instruments do not float 
freely in the international system, but are necessarily connected to pre-existing and more 
foundational principles, norms, rules, and organizational forms, and gain impetus from these 
associations. The basic building blocks of this legal architecture are found in a set of historically 
specific fundamental institutions—in the contemporary era, territorially based sovereign 
statehood, contractual international law, the sanctity of commitments, and multilateral 
diplomacy—that act as ordering principles to define the proper form and purpose of political 
communities (Reus-Smit 1997). These are mirrored in the development of customary legal 
norms relating to (for example) the legal personality and consequent responsibilities of states and 
other actors, the notional inviolability of borders, human rights, and the use of force (Byers 
1999). These constitutional features provide a basis for mutual recognition in identifying 
 legitimate social actors and developing more detailed criteria of acceptable behaviour manifested 
as legal rules. Hence, evolving norms concerning the scope of sovereignty and nature of 
fundamental human dignity have provided the fodder for international social change in areas as 
diverse as abolishing slavery, piracy, and territorial conquest, the decolonization and anti-
apartheid movements, and the global promotion of democracy (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008).  
This social density is key to the influence that international law can command. 
Constructivist scholars contend that states and other actors observe legal rules and norms 
because they regard the legal system as a whole as legitimately emerging from their own 
intersubjective practices. Rules are thus to be obeyed not simply because they are deemed valid 
or useful in isolation, but because legal structures are linked to the constitutive features of the 
international system and thereby precede and inform the rational pursuit of self-interest via law 
(Reus-Smit 2003:613). While compliance is driven in part by the desire of state actors to advance 
individualistic goals like improving organizational efficiency, bolstering their reputation or 
avoiding sanctions, these considerations are given meaning by a pre-existing belief that law is an 
especially legitimate means of social order, and consequently worthy of adherence. While 
politics and law are inextricably linked and necessarily interactive, actors regard the international 
legal realm (ideally) as a distinctive field in which outcomes are determined by the application of 
accepted principles, discourses, and practices of law rather than a purely political calculus driven 
by particularistic self-interest and the distribution of material power (Reus-Smit 2004b:36–37; 
Abbott and Snidal 2013:35). The transition to a legal form thus invests a norm with a particular 
rational-legal authority that is regarded as more legitimate and binding than non-legal standards. 
In this way, the resort to law is not just “cheap talk,” but profoundly influences the construction 
and conduct of international politics. 
 
The Promise of Non-Great Power Treaties 
 
This account helps explain how the strategic bet made by proponents of non-great power 
treaties—that authoritative social standards could be developed via rigorous rules without the 
initial endorsement of many powerful states—may be realized in practice. While not the only 
form that law can take, multilateral treaties offer an especially effective vehicle for generating 
new international norms. In the first case, multilateral negotiations serve as focal points in the 
  
crystallization of emergent norms (Coleman 2013), redefining appropriate responses to global 
challenges. The creation of a formal legal text translates general standards of appropriate 
behaviour into a set of more specific prescriptive and proscriptive rules and associated legal 
procedures distinguished by their codification and characteristic form of creation and 
regeneration (Percy 2007:387; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008:1). Put differently, a treaty serves as a 
public declaration that further clarifies the content of a norm and specifies its application to a 
particular context (providing greater certainty in terms of the scope and limits of obligation), and 
provides an institutional context for subsequent discursive efforts aimed at implementing, 
contesting, or further refining the law (Abbott et al. 2000:412–413; Brunnée and Toope 
2010:48).4 In this way, the legalization5 of norms matters to subsequent institutional efficacy by 
generating more authoritative—and hence socially powerful—cognitive and discursive resources 
for articulating and adjudicating debates over appropriate action.  
Key to this account is the social power generated by iterative, intersubjective dialogue 
structured by legal criteria, and the dense connections that are built between new institutions and 
more established international structures. First, since international legal obligation is 
fundamentally predicated upon, and sustained by, conceptions of appropriateness rather than 
enforcement, a treaty may bind its members without resort to the agency typically associated 
with leading states. Parties to a treaty have agreed to a set of obligations underpinned by broader 
social expectations concerning the legitimacy of law and the observation of commitments. 
Exposure to diplomatic processes can thus exert social pressures on state actors to endorse new 
ways of thinking with respect to matters of cause-and-effect and acceptable behaviour in the 
international system so as to conform to a newly articulated component of “responsible” 
statehood. These distinctly social qualities hold the potential to raise the costs of violations and 
the benefits of adherence beyond what can be provided by material inducements or coercive 
sanctions alone. 
This does not imply that treaty members must deeply identify with constituent obligations 
from the outset. States may initially join a treaty for self-interested reasons such as an attempt to 
diffuse criticism or gain material benefits. Yet in an environment governed by expectations of 
adherence and pro-social behaviour, continued participation in a treaty regime can generate 
pressures towards greater conformance and, gradually, the internalization of norms. The social 
processes that initially typified the negotiations carry over to the implementation phase and in 
 this way, institutions help coordinate successive efforts to generate compliance with and 
internalization of these new behavioural standards through the deployment of discursive claims 
concerning the status of the law, social rewards and punishments, and material resources (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 2013; Dai 2007; Smith-Cannoy 2012). Over time, these structured 
engagements can themselves generate greater affinity with legal norms and the re-construction of 
actor identities. I do not trace these processes in detail at the domestic level, but rather look for 
broad patterns and surprising results that suggest norm adoption across the system of states. 
Second, the nested structure of international law means that treaties may generate social 
pressures towards compliance even among those states that reject their binding legal obligations. 
While materially powerful states possess greater latitude to selectively interpret and challenge 
new institutional developments, they are still deeply embedded within the wider international 
legal and social order and are thus implicated in the complex web of practices from which a 
treaty derives (Krisch 2005:374). The prior acceptance of logically connected institutions—such 
as the laws of war or human rights principles—places important constraints on their ability to 
effectively contest new legal developments not to their liking. Even overtly hostile states are 
therefore rarely able to entirely ignore new institutions, but rather seek to balance an 
endorsement of broad principles with a rejection of specific commitments. In effect, non-parties 
frequently attempt to selectively invoke the language of new legal norms and rules to pursue 
their own, often contrary, policy goals, often by claiming that new rules are unsuitable in present 
circumstances. Yet partial engagement carries its own perils, as it can serve to further reinforce 
the social legitimacy of the particular institution as the arbiter of acceptable behaviour. This, in 
turn, can open non-party states up to forms of rhetorical entrapment—via challenges linked to 
factual disputes concerning their interpretation of the law or claims of hypocrisy in selectively 
applying legal commitments—that generate unintended pressures to more full adapt to new 
norms.  
Hence formal membership does not exhaust the ways in which treaties and associated 
norms may bear on the formation and execution of state policy. Resistant states may partially 
comply with a treaty, even as they continue to resist its legal force. This can take the form of 
ending some prohibited behaviours; in such cases, legal norms have the effect of foreclosing 
previously unexceptional acts while simultaneously increasing their perceived importance, 
rendering any policy reversal a more substantial political issue that it would have been otherwise. 
  
These behavioural adaptations may be mirrored in changes in state discourse that reflect an 
abandonment of certain rhetorical strategies due to a sensitivity to the social expectations 
fostered by a treaty. Under these conditions contestation is important precisely because it 
frequently reflects legal and normative reasoning and thus bolsters the legitimacy of the legal 
norm, in contrast to instances where a non-party succeeds in ignoring or rejecting a new 
institutional entirely. These processes may lead, over time, to further engagement by non-parties 
with the treaty and an incremental adoption of its standards; this can occur informally, initially 
by changing cost-benefit calculations with respect to informal compliance, and ultimately, 
perhaps, by altering underlying interests to correspond with treaty obligations.  
These theorized dynamics point to a further concern with how institutional efficacy can 
be assessed. How, in other words, do we know when a treaty has successfully instantiated a 
widely respected international social standard influencing the conduct of world politics? Richard 
Price has previously suggested that the impact of a legal initiative is most clearly apparent when 
“an emergent international rule induces states to engage in practices they would not otherwise 
perform.” (Price 2004a:114) Hence any assessment must be set against an implicit counterfactual 
in which observed behaviours (both adherence and contestation) differ from those which would 
have occurred absent the given norm or rule, and where the most persuasive evidence is drawn 
from instances where actor change is most unlikely and surprising. This is particularly important 
since, as already noted, many IR theories assume that non-great power treaties will at most 
reflect a set of relatively unchallenging commitments among a sub-set of (typically less 
powerful) states for which the legal restraints do not impose substantial burdens. Effectively 
countering this view therefore requires not only evidence of substantial policy shifts, but equally 
an account of why—whether for formal parties or non-parties—the observed adherence was due 
to the impact of legal rules or norms rather than an unproblematic convergence of pre-existing 
interests. 
Yet this must be conditioned by a recognition that, as social phenomena, the impact of 
norms is bound to vary with respect to the rate, breadth, and depth of internalization and policy 
change (Kirgis 1987; Price 2006). Most treaties do not enjoy perfect compliance, and the Mine 
Ban Treaty is no exception. Yet legal rules and norms can be “counterfactually valid,” in that 
they may continue to exert authority in the face of some contrary behaviours. Since norms are 
intersubjective social constructions, their power to shape outcomes can be partially assessed by 
 the way that alleged or proven transgressors explain their actions in order to maintain their status 
as legitimate members of the international community, and the response such claims receive 
from other relevant actors (Price 2006:261–263). States may seek to conceal violations, 
suggesting that the norm has gained sufficiently widespread support that non-adherence implies 
an unpalatable reputational cost. Alternatively, actors may seek to qualify their non-compliance 
as the product of special conditions that do not impede upon the general authority of the treaty, 
thereby reinforcing the collectively-held view that such actions are normally unacceptable. Even 
when detached from actual practice, therefore, such statements can “constitute legally relevant 
State practice in support of a rule prohibiting the actions in question.” (D’Amato 1988:469) 
Inversely, states may simply reject the authority of a legal instrument and assert that their own 
practices—whether involving explicit violations or not—are uncontroversial because the rules do 
not apply to them. These forms of direct challenge are the most damaging, as they weaken an 
emergent norm’s prospective claim to universality. Just as important in such scenarios are the 
responses from other states, civil society actors, and organizational bureaucracies, since they tell 
us whether violations are normalized as largely unremarkable or treated as aberrations that 
reinforce the social legitimacy and authoritative status of the law. Importantly, I do not contend 
that public discourse necessarily constitutes a faithful presentation of the private psychological 
dispositions of the myriad individual human actors that make up the state (Krebs and Jackson 
2007:40–42). But since international law is created, reproduced, and modified through publicly 
expressed views, official discourse constitutes highly relevant evidence concerning the effect of 
legal institutions irrespective of any judgement concerning the underlying sincerity of a claim.   
 
A CASE STUDY IN NON-GREAT POWER LAW: THE BAN ON ANTIPERSONNEL 
MINES 
 
Overview 
 
As the multilateral legal expression of the norm, the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty seeks to 
eliminate an entire category of weapons by prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling, and 
transfer of antipersonnel (AP) mines, along with a entrenching a series of positive obligations 
concerning the clearance of existing minefields and the provision of care for mine survivors.6 
  
The treaty draws inspiration from established international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly 
in reference to the notion that the right to choose the methods of warfare is not unlimited, 
prohibitions on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, and an articulation of the twin 
principles of distinction and discrimination (Maslen 2005:66–71). The rationale for a ban rests 
on a judgement that the inherent characteristics of AP mines—most especially concerning their 
persistence once deployed and inability to distinguish between legitimate military targets and 
civilians—mean that they cannot be employed in a way that would sufficiently respect existing 
legal principles (International Committee of the Red Cross 1997; Price 1998:627–631).  
At its heart, therefore, the MBT seeks to overturn a well-established international social 
standard that has traditionally regarded AP mines as largely unproblematic tools of war, subject 
to the same forms of regulation as other conventional military technologies like artillery shells, 
rockets, and personal infantry weapons. This entailed a fundamental re-conception of the 
meaning and limits of military utility, especially as AP mines were in widespread use at the time 
of the proposed ban.7 Hence, contrary to the claim that treaties only reflect existing interests 
(Downs et al. 1996; von Stein 2005), I contend that the mine ban constitutes a dramatic change 
in the international status quo regarding the legitimate conduct of warfare.  
Moreover, the treaty seeks to implement this new social expectation in the face of 
concerted resistance from major military powers. The United States, China, India, and Russia 
(among others) have long maintained that the deleterious humanitarian effects of AP mines 
stemmed from their irresponsible use by poorly trained armed forces and rebel groups and not 
from the legitimate operations of modern militaries (Morgan 2002). These states consequently 
supported an alternative legal framework that further regulated, but did not eliminate, the use AP 
mines, codified in Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons.8 It is particularly significant, then, that the process leading to the Mine Ban Treaty was 
precipitated by widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of negotiations on APII, which was 
regarded by many states and civil society groups as “overly complex and insufficiently stringent 
to deal with the extent of the humanitarian crisis.” (Maslen 2005:22) In contrast to earlier 
diplomatic experiences, the negotiation of the MBT was animated by a calculation that a global 
stigmatization of AP mines would be most effectively achieved via an uncompromising 
prohibition that permitted no exceptions, rather than through a more modest agreement that 
included concessions to military powers (Cameron 1998). The United States in particular sought 
 to secure a series of exemptions that it claimed were a necessary precondition for formal US 
membership, since an absolute and immediate ban placed undue burdens on the exercise of its 
global military responsibilities (United States of America 1997).9 Despite intense pressure from 
the US and other military powers, the pro-ban coalition refused to weaken the treaty via 
amendments or the possibility of reservations. At the heart of our assessment, therefore, is the 
question of whether, and to what extent, the MBT has realized widespread adherence with its 
particular normative claim and set of obligations, in light of these substantial challenges.  
  
Global Compliance with the Mine Ban 
 
Available evidence is strongly indicative of a robust stigma engendered by the mine ban 
movement and resulting treaty. The MBT was initially signed by 122 states in December 1997, 
and became operational on March 1, 1999 in what is widely regarded as the most rapid entry into 
force for a major multilateral treaty (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1999:3). As of 
October 2014, there are 162 State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and 35 non-parties. In this 
regard the MBT compares favourably against other multilateral initiatives: most notably, 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has 100 members.10 
But as noted already, this figure does not include many major military powers; this has led critics 
to charge that the treaty represents merely an unimportant commitment among states that would 
not have much use for AP mines in the first place, and excludes those actors that are most 
consequential to the employment—and regulation—of military violence in the international 
system. Yet prominent non-parties do not represent the only relevant constituency in judging the 
health of the mine ban norm. All of the 12 most mine-affected states are treaty members, as are 
the majority of those states with mine contamination; the treaty also encompasses the majority of 
the largest former AP mine producers (Vines 1998:124; International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines 2013a:18–22). 
The principal metrics of compliance all point to a rapidly declining reliance on 
antipersonnel mines over the past two decades. Fifteen states deployed AP mines in 1998 (when 
annual civil society reporting began); this number has decreased steadily to an average of two 
per year most recently. And with the notable exception of Turkey and Yemen, all confirmed 
instances of mine use have occurred among non-party states.11 A very similar pattern can be 
  
discerned in respect to the production and transfer of AP mines. These are critical to the efficacy 
of the norm because they constitute the enabling conditions for mine use. At least 50 states 
produced AP mines in the decades preceding the creation of the MBT, including a number of 
prominent ban supporters such as Belgium, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom; yet the vast 
majority have abandoned the practice as part of their endorsement of the mine ban (Vines 
1998:120; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1999:5–6). Only 12 states retain a capacity 
to produce AP mines12 and of that diminished group, most—including prominent treaty holdouts 
China, Russia, and the United States—have ceased active production (International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines 2013a:18). Finally, the mine ban has profoundly impacted the international 
market in the weapons. Since 1997 there have been no confirmed cases in which AP mines have 
been sold or transferred from one state to another state or rebel group. This contrasts with an 
estimated 34 states that were regular exporters of antipersonnel mines prior to the advent of the 
MBT (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1999:7). To the extent that it endures at all, the 
“global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and 
unacknowledged transfers,” (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2013a:1) further 
reflecting the change in social expectations concerning the weapon’s legitimacy.  
These measures of state change are evidence of a dramatic shift in the way in which the 
weapons are conceived in international society. The removal of AP mines as a tool of war is 
notable because it is not matched by a similarly substantial decline in the frequency of violent 
conflict in the international system: while the total number of armed conflicts has ebbed globally 
since the early 1990s, organized violence remains common. Moreover, intra-state conflicts—
precisely those in which inexpensive weapons predominate—continue in significant numbers.13 
Yet the use of AP mines has now become an aberration in international practice. Were it not for 
the effective stigmatization of the weapon initiated by the mine ban movement and treaty, we 
would expect AP mines to feature in a greater number of these conflicts, many of which had seen 
past use of the weapons. This suggests that something more than altered material conditions is 
responsible for this dramatic change in observed behaviour.  
 
Constructing a Legal Community: State Parties and the Mine Ban Treaty 
 
[C Head] Hard Cases in the Adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty 
  
Contrary to sceptical assumptions that, as consensual agreements, treaties only consolidate 
largely uncontroversial policy positions, constructivist scholars have argued that legal 
institutions may themselves reshape notions of appropriate behaviour and thus contribute to the 
transformation of identities and subsequent preferences. Support from actors engaged in violent 
armed conflicts—especially those which featured past mine use—provides especially compelling 
examples of how the Mine Ban Treaty has influenced the conception of state interests, since we 
would expect restrictive social standards to be least resilient under such conditions. Twenty-four 
states, including Colombia, Iraq, the Philippines, and Uganda joined the MBT during internal 
armed conflicts, or while their armed forces were engaged in foreign military campaigns.14 A 
further 14 ratified or acceded shortly after the end of armed hostilities and/or a significant 
transition of government, and where domestic political conflicts and border disputes continued to 
generate instability.15 These developments challenge the expectation that states would avoid 
costly obligations that require they abandon a potentially useful weapon, or in instances where 
they lack the capacity to make the necessary political, legal, and military adaptations.  
The adoption of a comprehensive ban on a previously prominent weapon was also 
challenging for many states subsequently identified as primary MBT supporters. Members of the 
Core Group of pro-ban states such as Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom were all formerly among the largest AP mine producers (Vines 1998:121 and 124), and 
have long experience operating as part of multinational military coalitions with the United States 
under the auspices of NATO and in conflicts like the 1990-1991 Gulf War. It was widely 
recognized at the time that the prohibition could have a significant impact on the future conduct 
of joint operations with the US (Jacobs 2004). Governments therefore faced substantial 
resistance from military officials fearful that the elimination of AP mines from their arsenals 
would weaken operational defences, imperil alliance commitments, and endanger soldiers’ lives 
(Lawson et al. 1998:164–165; Warmington and Tuttle 1998:50). All of these states initially 
viewed a comprehensive ban with great suspicion. Their subsequent enthusiastic support is 
therefore much more puzzling than is often recognized, since the decision was costly and 
contentious rather than uncontroversial.  
 
[C Head] Social Logics of Membership 
  
 
Explaining these changes is critical to understanding the role that international law can play in 
reshaping state identities and subsequent interests. Close attention to the wealth of discursive 
evidence demonstrates a powerful constitutive function of the Mine Ban Treaty through the 
introduction of a new legal norm that places AP mines outside the boundaries of legitimate state 
practice. In particular, the association with previously accepted legal principles of military 
necessity, proportionality, and discrimination, and more specific institutions like the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols has provided important impetus in shifting political 
conditions in favour of formal treaty membership. To that end, State Parties frequently cite the 
MBT’s importance to the progressive development of international humanitarian law in 
explaining their decision to join the MBT; this is frequently the case in states that were previous 
mine users (Republic of Angola 1997; Republic of Croatia 2002; Republic of Turkey 2007).  
The most fundamental effect of the Mine Ban Treaty has been to serve as a potent 
demonstration of responsible statehood, in which AP mines no longer feature as an acceptable 
means of pursuing national security objectives. The MBT was thus the first treaty adopted by the 
new state of South Sudan:  
 
It has been more than four months since the declaration of our independence on 9 July 2011, 
in which my country has promised the world it would honor all the principles of international 
law by playing an active role in peace and world security…. Having seen the devastation 
including severe injury and environmental damage caused by landmines during the twenty-
one years of fighting for freedom, the movement / army of liberation of the people of Sudan 
banned the use of landmines in all combat operations. We have defended the cause of the 
treaty before becoming a state. (Republic of South Sudan 2011) 
 
In such cases, endorsement of the mine ban has been explicitly understood to signal a break with 
the previous political order and a consequent (re-)induction into the international community, as 
also happened with states like Serbia and Montenegro and South Africa.   
This transformation in a core feature of state policy also occurred in states that came to be 
regarded as key supporters of the movement to ban AP mines – and hence allegedly easy cases 
for norm adoption. In his seminal article, Price (1998) argued that exposure to the normative 
claims of the ban movement—and especially the invocation of legal principles to portray the use 
of AP mines as inherently illegitimate in light of their humanitarian effects—was instrumental in 
 shifting elite opinion in a number of states such as Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, via 
mechanisms of persuasion and emulation. Italy, formerly one of the largest AP mine producers, 
therefore decided to join pro-ban constituency “not because anti-personnel mines have in our 
view become militarily redundant or obsolete, but because we have accorded priority status to 
the disarmament and humanitarian aspects of the issue.” (Italian Republic 2004) As Petrice 
Flowers points out, this constituted a radical departure even for an officially pacifist state like 
Japan, since the decision to join came in the face of extensive US pressure and cut against “the 
entrenched idea that land mines were an essential tool necessary to defend Japan in case of land 
invasion.” (Japan 2004; Flowers 2009:7) Yet here as with a number of other states concerns for 
status and legitimacy ultimately provided the permissive conditions for formal membership, as 
Japan joined the mine ban in order to reinforce its identity as an advocate of humanitarianism 
and role model for the Asian region (Japan 2004; Flowers 2009:139). The normative force of the 
mine ban movement and resulting treaty was thus instrumental in reshaping a basic expectation 
of state policy such that adherence to the prohibition of antipersonnel mines became the standard 
against which fundamental interests—including the conduct of military operations and the 
territorial defence of the state—are assessed. 
Recognition of new social expectations has also created political space for the gradual 
transformation of state identities and interests even where immediate membership was regarded 
as impossible. A number of states have made a point of signalling their support for the 
humanitarian purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, even while asserting that domestic conditions—
most notably armed conflicts or the lack of technical capacity to meet treaty obligations—
precluded earlier membership (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2001; Republic of 
Sudan 2001; Ukraine 2003; The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia 2004; Republic of 
Turkey 2007). The adoption of pro-treaty discourse was not merely cost-free rhetoric, designed 
to placate mine ban proponents without meaningful consequences, as sceptics would expect. 
Instead, such efforts have signalled an important transition in the sensitivity of actors to social 
expectations anchored in specific legal obligations. It is first of all significant that non-members 
would seek to frame their policies in reference to a standard they had yet to officially join, 
suggesting its accruing legitimacy among the community of states. More substantively, general 
endorsement drew these states into dialogue with other concerned actors on the terms of the mine 
ban itself, and thus narrowed the range justifications for continued non-membership. Claims of 
  
security conditions or technical incapacity thus provided the context for future discussions over 
the merits of the mine ban, provided a rhetorical opening that was exploited by the ICBL and 
other states to push these states to progressively close the gap between their stated aims and 
actual policies.  
Finland and Poland exemplify this process. Both states were early and consistent 
supporters of the ban, and accepted the claims of the pro-ban constituency that AP mines 
presented an unacceptable humanitarian threat that could only be adequately addressed via the 
comprehensive prohibition. Yet both also long insisted that their elimination of AP mines and 
formal adoption of the MBT could only occur once alternative military systems were available to 
replace their operational functions in border security and the protection of military assets 
(Republic of Poland 2001; Republic of Finland 2002). But rather than hollow diplomatic 
overtures, the acknowledgement of the legal and normative merit of the mine ban position drew 
Finland and Poland into successive rounds of discussion within the diplomatic environment of 
the MBT, and generated a form of rhetorical dissonance wherein both states had to continually 
explain the divergence between their stated principles and actual behaviour. Initially this had the 
effect of stimulating forms of behavioural adaptation—including a pledge not to produce AP 
mines or maintain active minefields on their territory—that were intended as demonstrations of 
good faith to the mine ban norm (Republic of Finland 2002). More fully, the discursive context 
provided the conditions for effective social influence, as domestic constituencies, civil society 
actors, and other states were able to exert pressure on the respective governments to formalize 
their commitment via ratification. The European Union’s unified support for the mine ban was 
particularly consequential, since it highlighted a prominent gap in both states’ identity as modern 
European nations.  
The desire to adhere to the mine ban as a marker of status then stimulated a search for 
alternative technologies to replace AP mines in military doctrine, efforts that interacted with a 
perceived improvement in the security challenges facing the two states.16 Yet such assessments 
were not driven by dispassionate judgements that changes in material conditions had rendered 
mines irrelevant, as a realist account would suggest, but rather relied to a substantial degree on 
shifting conceptions of the nature of military utility itself. The key here was the reciprocal 
dialogue between an external social stigma and domestically derived perception of interests, in 
which relevant policy actors came to accept that national security goals could be achieved 
 without antipersonnel mines, in light of a powerful new standard of appropriate behaviour. This 
further demonstrates the constructivist contention that material conditions are not stable 
properties, but are themselves fundamentally assessed through social processes of identity 
formation and change (Wendt 1992). Finland therefore ratified the MBT in January 2012 while 
Poland followed suit in December of the same year. 
 
[C Head] Exceptional Politics: Denials, Justifications, and the Status of the Mine Ban Norm 
 
The social power of the mine ban has been further reinforced in moments where the legal 
prohibition has come under threat from real or apparent violations. Allegations of non-
compliance have, in the first instance, frequently been met with vigorous denials by the subject 
states, as was the case when Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were accused of deploying AP mines (Bower 2012:134–137). In 
contrast, a few states have acknowledged violations of the MBT, yet at the same time sought to 
portray these actions as fundamentally unique situations that did not invalidate their general 
respect for treaty obligations. Thus at the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, 
the Angolan Ambassador specifically identified the ongoing civil war—and the existential threat 
faced by the current government—as necessitating the use of AP mines while signatories to the 
Mine Ban Treaty (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2001). More recently, Yemeni 
representatives have admitted deploying mines around a military base in 2011 during armed 
clashes with local tribes, on similar grounds of defending against the collapse of the state 
(Republic of Yemen, 2014). Finally, others have acknowledged potential non-compliance, and 
responded with promises of policy action including internal investigations and judicial processes, 
as has been undertaken by Cambodia, Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen (International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines 2013a:4–7).  
Sceptics might understandably question the sincerity of such efforts. International 
Relations scholars have recognized that states often employ official discourse to deliberately 
obscure their actions and misrepresent their views or intentions (Krebs and Jackson 2007; 
Seymour 2014). Forms of denial and exceptional justification may therefore constitute genuine 
attempts to explain and address potential wrongdoing, or strategic responses to deflect social 
pressure. While the underlying motivations for actions would provide important information 
  
concerning the internalization of norms, accessing the genuine psychological beliefs of actors is 
methodologically problematic (Krebs and Jackson 2007:40–41). Yet official statements are still 
highly relevant to the intersubjective status of norms and rules since these institutions ultimately 
rely on collective agreement concerning their legitimate authority, and are consequently 
promoted, contested, and modified via processes of endorsement and critique undertaken largely 
in public diplomatic settings. For this reason, strategic attempts to secure status or reputation 
through ostensible compliance with legal rules and norms presuppose a normative environment 
in which a community of actors both shares a conception of rightful action and possesses the 
capacity to bestow or remove these social benefits.  
Discourse among MBT members demonstrates these potent conditioning effects of norms 
on political action. First, statements from targeted states reflect a profound awareness of the 
expectations of the treaty community and the social costs that stem from real or perceived 
transgressions. Rather than seeking to normalize non-compliance and the implicated states have 
instead pledged fidelity to legal obligations (Republic of Turkey 2013; Republic of Yemen 
2013). In this sense, the denials or exceptional circumstances invoked by transgressors actually 
serve to uphold the authority of the prohibition under all but the most extreme conditions. 
Second, these discursive processes have taken place within a diplomatic environment in which 
State Parties and civil society actors frequently engage in public and private diplomacy with the 
aim of reinforcing the legal authority of the treaty. These iterative engagements are crucial to 
building a collective sense of community and with it a commitment to the treaty as legitimate 
and obligating. Price (1998:617) has previously noted that “violations provide the most 
opportune moments to define and discipline a particular practice as an aberration.” It is therefore 
significant that other MBT members have issued repeated, if often cautious, statements 
condemning violations and reiterating the absolute prohibition against mine use (e.g., States 
Parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, 2014: 72). Just as importantly, interventions have 
employed both the specific legal criteria of the treaty and broader associated principles of 
international law—such as rules of IHL and expectations concerning the observation of legally 
binding commitments—as focal point for discussions over deviance and good practice.17 
In sum, while a very few states have explained their use of AP mines under limited 
conditions, they have not deployed this claim as a means of systematically challenging the 
legitimacy of the Mine Ban Treaty. Equally, State Parties have recognized these as instances of 
 deviance rather than justifiable or routine exceptions. The threshold for violations remains 
exceedingly high, therefore, even if the prohibition has been breached in some discrete cases. 
This again is a substantial change from the prevailing pattern before the mine ban movement, in 
which AP mines were regarded as thoroughly unexceptional weapons. Hence contrary to the 
sceptical view, membership in the mine ban community does not merely reflect the formalization 
of pre-existing interests; rather, for a sizable number of states, engagement with the mine ban 
regime has helped recast what they regard as acceptable behaviour in the first place, in a core 
area of national policy.  
 
Adherence Without Legal Endorsement: Non-Parties and Mine Ban Norm 
 
Thinking of international law as a nested social structure also helps account for the reaction of 
states that remain outside of the Mine Ban Treaty. A central contention of my theoretical account 
is that embeddedness within the wider international legal and social system generates pressures 
to conform to more specific rules and norms despite official ambivalence. It is therefore 
significant that non-parties are deeply integrated in the operations of the mine ban regime, 
participating in meetings as official observer delegations.  
 
[C Head] Rhetorical Adaptation and Its Consequences 
 
Exposure to the mine ban norm has manifested itself first in the widespread adoption of general 
treaty claims in non-party discourse. Virtually every non-member state has expressed support for 
the humanitarian aims of the ban, and has identified AP mines as a significant and enduring 
threat to civilian populations (Bower 2012:128–132). In doing so, moreover, they have 
acknowledged a lineage between the MBT and prior international law—such as the St. 
Petersburg Declaration and the Geneva Conventions—aimed at ameliorating the effects of 
warfare (People’s Republic of China 2003). The linkage to existing standards of IHL is 
important, as it offers a point of reference in generating greater comfort with new obligations. 
Leading military powers including China, India, Israel, Russia, and the United States have 
consequently endorsed the objective of the global elimination of AP mines at some (unspecified) 
future point (Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW 2001:11, para. 12). 
  
 Despite this, many prominent non-parties continue to envision a legitimate military role 
for AP mines in defending borders or forward-deployed military units (Israel 1999; Department 
of State, United States of America 2004; People’s Republic of China 2014; Republic of India 
2014). As noted already, these states have long argued that restrictions on the use of 
antipersonnel mines—most specifically concerning their use in defined areas with appropriate 
fencing and signage, their prompt removal after the end of hostilities, and where possible the 
utilization of self-destruct and self-deactivation technologies—are the most appropriate means of 
ameliorating the threat posed to civilian populations (Maslen 2005:18–22). In light of this 
disjuncture, pubic declarations of conditional support for an outright ban might be regarded as 
merely cynical efforts at avoiding international critique rather than the sincere engagement with 
new social expectations. 
Yet such a view under-appreciates the political significance of the rhetorical shift 
occasioned by the mine ban movement. Prominent non-parties have a now accepted a partial re-
conception of responsible international behaviour that qualifies the value of AP mines against a 
principle of humanitarian protection. The Chinese observer delegation (echoing sentiments of 
many other non-parties) has repeatedly stated that  
 
[a]s a responsible member of the international community, China has always been a 
constructive participant in the process of international conventional disarmament and a 
staunch supporter of international efforts to address humanitarian concerns caused by APLs. 
Given its national conditions and national defence needs, China still [can] not accede to the 
convention at this stage. However, China ascribes to the goal and principles of the 
convention and highly appreciates the humanitarian spirit embodied in the convention. 
(People’s Republic of China 2014) 
 
As previous authors have noted, forms of hypocrisy can generate unintended pressures to more 
full adapt to new behavioural standards, since they provide discursive openings that can be 
exploited by other actors to push states to close the gap between their stated ambitions and 
particular (contrary) behaviours (Risse et al. 1999). By adopting this humanitarian discourse, 
therefore, non-parties have contributed to a narrowing of the acceptable scope for AP mine use 
that has imposed new limits on the range of publicly defensible policy positions. With the 
exception of Libya (under Gaddafi), Myanmar, Syria, and (until 2009) Russia, no states openly 
justify their use of AP mines. Instead, when faced with allegations non-parties seek to obfuscate 
 through silence, denial, or by blaming other states or rebel groups for violations (e.g., Georgia 
2006). This in turn reflects a sensitivity to status considerations and provides important evidence 
for the social power of the norm. The fact that actors choose to conceal their behaviour, rather 
than openly declaring their non-compliance, suggests that they recognize a political cost 
associated with overt violation of the mine ban, albeit one they do not officially recognize as 
legally binding. Even apparently cynical attempts to invoke legal or normative standards to 
deflect criticism can therefore have lasting consequences for the development of norms, by 
further reinforcing the social legitimacy of the particular institution as the arbiter of acceptable 
behaviour. 
These processes of rhetorical adaptation are reflected in behavioural changes involving a 
rapidly declining reliance on the weapons. As noted above, few states use, produce, or trade in 
AP mines; this includes non-party states, despite the fact that many remain engaged in internal 
armed conflicts or have ongoing challenges in securing their frontiers in which mines have 
historical featured.18 It is particularly notable that the United States has not used antipersonnel 
mines since the 1991 Gulf War, a period which includes intensive military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2013b). This experience is 
mirrored in the introduction of formal moratoria on the production19 and transfer20 of the 
weapons by a number of major military powers (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
2013a:18). These incremental changes have important compounding effects over time as 
previously unexceptional practices are removed from the menu of “normal” policy options. The 
international stigmatization of AP mines has thus increased the political salience of the issue 
such that any future decision to resume these behaviours would involve the most senior decision 
makers, further deemphasizing the role of AP mines in modern military arsenals.  
 
[C Head] (Informally) Tying Down Gulliver: The United States and the Mine Ban 
 
The United States provides a particularly vivid example of how the interaction with a new 
international social standard has served to progressively transform national policies. President 
Clinton was the first world leader to call for the eventual elimination of AP mines, and the US 
was consequently an active participant in early debates over a prospective mine ban (United 
States of America 1994). Yet the United States rejected the final negotiated treaty text when 
  
middle power states leading the diplomacy refused to incorporate a series of demands modifying 
the scope of the legal prohibition to conform with US military requirements. The United States 
signed the treaty as a symbolic gesture, but did not seek ratification and largely withdrew from 
the mine ban regime.21 Though formally opposed to the mine ban, however, the United States 
has substantially altered its behaviour in line with the terms of MBT: in addition to its noted non-
use, it has maintained moratoria on the export and production of AP mines since 1992 and 1997, 
respectively. And, in much the same fashion as many late-joining members, successive US 
administrations responded to the growing international support for the mine ban with a wide-
ranging search for alternative technologies that could replace AP mines in military doctrine. In 
2004 the Bush administration announced that it would eliminate all forms of “persistent” mines 
(those without self-destruct or deactivation features) from its arsenal, while retaining the right to 
develop and use so-called “smart” mines that in its view addressed the humanitarian threat posed 
by the weapons (Department of State, United States of America 2004).22 
While initially regarded as a strategic concession to appease critics, the employment of 
humanitarian discourse surrounding AP mines stimulated domestic political battles that led to 
further constraints on military procurement. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines and 
its US-based affiliate (USCBL) challenged the new policy on the grounds that it did not fully 
meet the standards of the Mine Ban Treaty, since certain types of AP mines would still be 
permitted. After extensive lobbying by the USCBL and with prominent support from long time 
ban advocate Senator Patrick Leahy, the United States Congress voted to withhold funding for 
Department of Defence research and procurement of mine systems with victim-activated features 
(that would be prohibited under the MBT). This injunction specifically included new weapons 
that would otherwise be permitted under the 2004 policy directive. Subsequent weapons 
development has consequently focused solely on systems that conform to the legal criteria of the 
Mine Ban Treaty (Malenic 2008; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2009:1131–1132).  
US participation in the mine ban regime has further deepened under current President 
Obama, and has served as a deliberate symbol of a wider reengagement with multilateral 
institutions and a generally more permissive view of international law. Once in office, the 
administration announced a comprehensive policy review to evaluate the continued necessity of 
AP mines in light of changing international conditions (International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines 2013b). This process has recently culminated in a pledge that the United States will 
 observe the obligations of the MBT—by abandoning the use of antipersonnel mines, refraining 
from assisting other states in acts that violate the treaty, and destroying mine stockpiles—in all 
circumstances other than with respect to the defence of South Korea. While still incomplete, this 
new position “represent[s] a further step to advance the humanitarian aims of the [Mine Ban 
Treaty] and to bring US practice in closer alignment with a global humanitarian movement that 
has had a demonstrated positive impact in reducing civilian casualties from [AP mines].” (United 
States of America 2014) 
Despite official ambivalence, therefore, recent practice demonstrates a marginalization of 
AP mines in the military doctrine of the United States and other powerful non-parties. Hence 
new international institutions may influence domestic practice even before formal adherence to a 
legal instrument, a prospect that is insufficiently appreciated by positivist accounts of 
international legal obligation and efficacy. These findings more specifically challenge the 
contention of realist scholars that the US—as the preeminent global power—will be largely able 
to avoid new institutional constraints on its exercise of leadership and freedom of action 
(Glennon 2001; Wohlforth 2012). Instead, the participation of the US and other powers in an 
international legal and normative system that includes the mine ban has generated social 
pressures towards adaptation, through a linkage with more fundamental principles of 
international humanitarian law. This has forced these states to publicly articulate, and in many 
cases defend, their policies on the terms of a new institution they officially reject. And, in the 
same way that they have policed actions among formal members, State Parties have not 
recognized violations even by non-parties as constituting valid exceptions to the prohibition. For 
this reason, states that might otherwise serve as “spoilers”—by undercutting the interpretation 
and application of new norms through their practices—have been unable to weaken the treaty. 
These developments would have been inconceivable in the absence of the particular force 
enjoyed by the mine ban, and the social power accorded to international law more generally. 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA ON NON-GREAT POWER LAW 
 
Understanding the possibility and potential limits of non-great power diplomacy adds an 
important dimension of our conception of international politics, but this subject has not been 
adequately addressed thus far. The case study of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty powerfully 
  
demonstrates the potent role that legal institutions may play in altering state practice in the face 
of great power resistance. The most basic effect of the mine ban has been to introduce a new 
international social expectation concerning the special status of antipersonnel mines. As a 
consequence, the prohibition is the now the accepted standard against which other national 
interests—including the fundamental defence of the state—are assessed, even among states not 
formally subject to the legal obligations of the treaty. The use of AP mines has therefore become 
a highly exceptional occurrence, in stark contrast to the prior international status quo in which 
the weapons were promiscuous features in warfare. This shift in international expectations—and 
the close temporal connection between the emergence of the ban and the scale of change—
cannot be adequately explained in the absence of the Mine Ban Treaty and associated norm.  
The present study was motivated by a fundamental question concerning when, and under 
what conditions, less powerful states and civil society actors should seek to promote international 
norms and rules without the great powers. To that end, it offered a detailed theoretical and 
empirical appraisal of an archetypal example, as the basis for a more holistic accounting of the 
promises and perils of this strategy. The assessment of a single—albeit important—case is 
necessarily limited in its explanatory scope. Here I briefly outline an agenda for future research 
on non-great power governance, identifying three core areas in need of further attention.  
First, the above discussion largely brackets detailed consideration of domestic political 
factors in favour of a structural account of norm adoption across the system of states; additional 
work should assess variation in the internalization of norms and the processes through which 
international institutions are promoted, interpreted, and contested at the national level 
(Koremenos 2013:74). The IR literature has long been interested with how domestic 
characteristics like regime type and connections to the international system shape patterns of 
actor change and render states more or less susceptible to socialization (Hafner-Burton et al. 
2012:69–72). Status considerations clearly loom large in the adoption of the mine ban, and this 
effect does not appear to be substantially limited to mature democracies. It would be worth 
systematically exploring whether political type is significantly connected to adoption of the MBT 
and indeed other international commitments, since some recent large-n statistical research has 
demonstrated that non-democratic states are much more impervious to international human rights 
norms (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). Relatedly, the evidence provided above strongly 
suggests that engagement in the mine ban regime and wider international system is crucial to 
 prospects for norm adoption. Exposure to diplomatic processes has frequently generated change 
in state policies, while the discursive adoption of core institutional claims provides the rhetorical 
opening by which outside actors may draw states into dialogue and push for greater behavioural 
adaptation. However, the findings could be bolstered with detailed tracing in discrete state cases 
with the aim of understanding the mechanisms—including coercion, reputation, side payments, 
persuasion, and social pressure—through which legal rules and norms are internalized or 
challenged, and the relevant sub-state actors—such as bureaucrats, military officers, and political 
elites—involved in these processes, as numerous studies have done in other issue areas. 
A wider scholarly agenda would also attend to the agency of non-state actors in two 
respects. On the one hand, the varying roles of transnational civil society in promoting non-great 
power norms needs detailed attention. Risse et al.’s influential “spiral model,” for example, 
explains variation in the implementation of human rights norms by examining the linkages 
between transnational norm entrepreneurs and international organizations on the one hand, and 
domestic opposition groups and the national government of violating states on the other (Risse et 
al. 1999, 2013; similarly: Dai 2007; Smith-Cannoy 2012). TCS actors were crucial to the initial 
negotiation of treaties like the Mine Ban Treaty, and presumably are equally vital to subsequent 
implementation efforts in the absence of leading powers. I briefly drew attention to the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines as the most prominent TCS actor in the mine ban 
case; yet this organization is itself composed of myriad sub-organizations and individuals 
spanning peace activists, religious and community groups, academics, former government 
officials, lawyers, and so on. In the future, particular attention should paid to identifying these 
domestic and transnational actors, specifying the various roles and degrees of access they enjoy, 
and the potential impact this has on the rates and extent of state change.  
On the other hand, a richer account of normative change must seek to account for the 
response to new international standards among entities like multinational corporations and armed 
non-state actors. There are particular methodological challenges in studying internalization and 
implementation in such entities, since the former are typically not directly involved in relevant 
diplomatic settings and the latter often exist on the periphery of international recognition and 
may lack a stable composition and leadership structure. Yet such actors play an important role in 
the reception of global norms, nor least because they are frequently implicated in violations 
concerning armed violence, human rights, and environmental protection (among many issue 
  
areas). Examining these processes systematically also offers an opportunity to compare how 
mechanisms for generating compliance operate in state and non-state contexts (Jo and Thomson 
2014). 
Finally, linking concerns for mechanisms and actors, future research on non-great power 
law must seek to situate the MBT within the wider universe of actual or potential cases (Brem 
and Stiles 2009; Fehl 2012). On the one hand, this requires a comparative examination of the 
relative efficacy of other successful examples, most notably the Kyoto Protocol, International 
Criminal Court, and Convention on Cluster Munitions. On the other hand, the detailed 
assessment of existing non-great power institutions must be set against negative cases drawn 
from two alternative governance scenarios where the international community (a) includes 
concessions to great powers in order to secure their inclusion in a formal treaty (as was the case 
with the recent Arms Trade Treaty); or (b) abandons multilateralism in the face of opposition and 
pursues informal arrangements or none at all (as with the proposed adoption in 2002 of a 
verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) (Price 2004b). 
Incorporating instances where the United States and others powers did successfully shape new 
institutions will provide greater analytic leverage in evaluating both the prospects and perils of 
the particular type of governance highlighted here. 
Thinking of particular institutions as part of a nested international legal and social system 
offers important leverage in explaining these divergent outcomes. Actors promoting new legal 
institutions are not creating the world anew, but are rather tapping into a highly resonant shared 
legal heritage within the context of an international social system that already privileges law as a 
particularly legitimate mode of claim making. Yet these linkages are not automatic, but must be 
cultivated: emergent subjects that can be persuasively connected to existing norms are much 
more likely to become widely respected international standards (Price 1998:627–631, 2003:584; 
Finnemore and Toope 2001:749). Inversely, institutions that sharply diverge from past 
experience should be expected to face the greatest challenge at both the negotiation and 
implementation phases. But what types of norms are most amenable to codification in binding 
multilateral rules and subsequent widespread adoption? Previous research has suggested that 
issue characteristics matter, implying that certain subjects may be more or less suitable for 
effective governance. The content of a proposed norm may for instance bear on its prospective 
appeal, as “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, and legal equality of 
 opportunity” are most likely to lead to successful development of new norms and (potentially) 
legal rules (Keck and Sikkink 1998:204). This was clearly the case in the most prominent 
examples of institutional development without the great powers: discourses of humanitarianism 
were central to the emergence and consolidation of the mine ban, as noted at length above. Yet 
similar logics propelled the development of the ICC and more recent Convention on Cluster 
Munitions and, in a broader sense of harm to human populations and the natural environment, 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
While such discourses appear critical, they are not sufficient in isolation, since do not 
fully explain negative cases – the non-adoption of a comprehensive treaty banning child soldiers, 
for example, would also seem to fit the criteria of humanitarian impact that has pervaded 
successful cases. A variety of other potential factors may influence the prospects for legal and 
normative development, including the purported immediacy of the issue (itself partly a function 
of agenda-setting), the technical difficulty of proposed solutions, and the potential for self-
enforcement via reciprocity (Price 2003:598–600; Hafner-Burton et al. 2012:60–69). Similarly, 
successful instances of non-great power diplomacy all share a fundamental coalitional structure 
combining geographically diverse middle power states and transnational civil society as leaders 
in norm development. Recent work applying social network analysis to TCS advocacy has 
further demonstrated that linkages between individuals and groups within a campaign profoundly 
shape what issues are adopted and the success with which they proliferate in the international 
system (Carpenter 2011). Systematic, comparative research can suggest whether certain issue 
areas—trade, disarmament, human rights, and environmental protection, among others—are 
more or less susceptible to the type of multilateralism discussed here, and whether alternative 
legal and non-legal approaches may be more appropriate. This would help scholars and 
policymakers alike better understand the conditions under which non-great power diplomacy 
may prove successful, and when such a strategy is to be avoided. 
  
  
References 
 
ABBOTT, KENNETH W., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, ANDREW MORAVCSIK, ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, 
AND DUNCAN SNIDAL. (2000) The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 
54: 401–420. 
ABBOTT, KENNETH W., AND DUNCAN SNIDAL. (2013) Law, Legalization, and Politics: An 
Agenda for the Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars. In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, edited by Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
BOLTON, MATTHEW, AND THOMAS NASH. (2010) The Role of Middle Power–NGO Coalitions in 
Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban. Global Policy 1: 172–184. 
BORGEN, CHRISTOPHER. (2009) The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers 
and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 10: 1–33. 
BOWER, ADAM. (2012) Norm Development Without the Great Powers: Assessing the 
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of British Columbia. Available at: 
https://circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/43704. 
BOWER, ADAM, AND RICHARD PRICE. (2013) Moral Mission Accomplished? Assessing the 
Landmine Ban. In Justice, Sustainability, and Security: Global Ethics for the 21st 
Century, edited by Eric A. Heinze. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
BREM, STEFAN, AND KENDALL W STILES. (2009) Co-Operating without America: Theories and 
Case Studies of Non-Hegemonic Regimes. London: Routledge. 
BROOKS, STEPHEN G., AND WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH. (2008) World out of Balance: International 
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
BRUNNÉE, JUTTA, AND STEPHEN J. TOOPE. (2010) Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: 
An Interactional Account. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
BYERS, MICHAEL. (1999) Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
CAMERON, MAXWELL A. (1998) Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a 
Model. In To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, edited by 
Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin. Toronto: Oxford 
University Press. 
 CAMERON, MAXWELL A., ROBERT J. LAWSON, AND BRIAN W. TOMLIN, Eds. (1998) To Walk 
Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Toronto: Oxford University 
Press. 
CARPENTER, R. CHARLI. (2011) Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the 
Paradox of Weapons Norms. International Organization 65: 69–102. 
COLEMAN, KATHARINA P. (2013) Locating Norm Diplomacy: Venue Change in International 
Norm Negotiations. European Journal of International Relations 19: 163–186. 
DAI, XINYUAN. (2007) International Institutions and National Policies. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
D’AMATO, ANTHONY. (1988) Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd. 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 21: 459–472. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (2004) Fact Sheet: New United States 
Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States 
Soldiers. Washington, DC: Department of State. Available at: 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/landmines/FactSheet_NewUSPolicy_2-27-04.htm. 
(Accessed July 23, 2012). 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (1998) Hidden Killers: The Global 
Landmine Crisis. Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of 
Humanitarian Demining Programs. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_toc.html. (Accessed July 23, 
2012). 
DESTRADI, SANDRA. (2010) Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and 
Leadership. Review of International Studies 36: 903–930. 
DOWNS, GEORGE W., DAVID M. ROCKE, AND PETER N. BARSOOM. (1996) Is the Good News 
about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50: 379–
406. 
FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA. (2001) Statement by Mr. Meheret Getahoun, 
Head of Delegation to the Permanent Mission to the United Nations. 
FEHL, CAROLINE. (2012) Livng with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Resonses to US 
Unilateralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
FINNEMORE, MARTHA J., AND STEPHEN TOOPE. (2001) Alternatives to Legalization: Richer 
Views of Law and Politics. International Organization 55: 743–758. 
FLOWERS, PETRICE. (2009) Refugees, Women, and Weapons: International Norm Adoption and 
Compliance in Japan. 1 edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
  
FOOT, ROSEMARY, S. NEIL MACFARLANE, AND MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, Eds. (2003) US 
Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral 
Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
FORDHAM, BENJAMIN O., AND VICTOR ASAL. (2007) Billiard Balls or Snowflakes? Major Power 
Prestige and the International Diffusion of Institutions and Practices. International 
Studies Quarterly 51: 31–52. 
GEORGIA. (2006) Statement by Georgia. 
GLENNON, MICHAEL J. (2001) Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after 
Kosovo. New York: Palgrave. 
GOLDSMITH, JACK. (2003) The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court. University of 
Chicago Law Review 70: 89–104. 
GUZMAN, ANDREW T. (2008) How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
HAFNER-BURTON, EMILIE M., AND KIYOTERU TSUTSUI. (2007) Justice Lost! The Failure of 
International Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most. Journal of Peace 
Research 44: 407–425. 
HAFNER-BURTON, EMILIE M., DAVID G. VICTOR, AND YONATAN LUPU. (2012) Political Science 
Research on International Law: The State of the Field. The American Journal of 
International Law 106: 47–97. 
HERBY, PETER, AND KATHLEEN LAWAND. (2008) Unacceptable Behavior: How Norms Are 
Established. In Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human 
Security, edited by Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, and Mary Wareham. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT. (2013) Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global 
Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation. Vancouver: Human Security Press. 
Available at: http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2013/text.aspx. (Accessed 
September 25, 2014). 
HURRELL, ANDREW. (2006) Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be 
Great Powers? International Affairs 82: 1–19. 
IKENBERRY, G. JOHN. (2011) Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 
American World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
IKENBERRY, G. JOHN, AND CHARLES A. KUPCHAN. (1990) Socialization and Hegemonic Power. 
International Organization 44: 283–315. 
 IKENBERRY, G. JOHN, MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, AND WILLIAM CURTI WOHLFORTH. (2011) 
International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES. (1999) Landmine Monitor 1999. New York: 
Human Rights Watch. Available at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&
pqs_report=&pqs_section=. (Accessed March 4, 2014). 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES. (2001) n.p. Landmine Monitor 2001: Angola 
Country Report. New York: Human Rights Watch / ICBL. Available at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2001/angola/. (Accessed March 11, 
2014). 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES. (2009) Landmine Monitor 2009. Ottawa: Mines 
Action Canada / ICBL. Available at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2009/. (Accessed March 7, 2014). 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES. (2013a) Landmine Monitor 2013. Geneva: 
ICBL. Available at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2013/. (Accessed March 6, 2014). 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES. (2013b) n.p. Landmine Monitor 2013: United 
States Country Report. Geneva: ICBL. Available at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3141. (Accessed March 12, 
2014). 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. (1997) Anti-Personnel Landmines. Friend or 
Foe?. Geneva: ICRC. 
ISRAEL. (1999) Statement by Mr. Giora Becher, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
ITALIAN REPUBLIC. (2004) Statement by Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Senator 
Alfredo Mantica. Available at: http://www.nairobisummit.org/high-level-
segment/overview/. (Accessed September 18, 2014). 
JACOBS, CHRISTOPHER W. (2004) Taking the Next Step: An Analysis of the Effects the Ottawa 
Convention May Have on the Interoperability of United States Forces with the Armed 
Forces of Australia, Great Britain, and Canada. Military Law Review 180: 49–114. 
JAPAN. (2004) Statement by Mr. Katsuyuki Kawai, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.nairobisummit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-
RC1/high_level/Japan_HLS_RC2004.pdf. (Accessed September 19, 2014). 
JO, HYERAN, AND CATARINA P. THOMSON. (2014) Legitimacy and Compliance with International 
Law: Access to Detainees in Civil Conflicts, 1991–2006. British Journal of Political 
Science 44: 323–355. 
  
KECK, MARGARET E, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK. (1998) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
KIRGIS, FREDERIC L. (1987) Custom on a Sliding Scale. The American Journal of International 
Law 81: 146–151. 
KOREMENOS, BARBARA. (2013) Institutionalism and International Law. In Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, 
edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
KOREMENOS, BARBARA, CHARLES LIPSON, AND DUNCAN SNIDAL. (2001) The Rational Design of 
International Institutions. International Organization 55: 761–799. 
KRASNER, STEPHEN D. (1976) State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World 
Politics 28: 317–347. 
KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH. (2014) The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role 
and Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. 
KREBS, RONALD R., AND PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON. (2007) Twisting Tongues and Twisting 
Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13: 
35–66. 
KRISCH, NICO. (2005) International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the 
Shaping of the International Legal Order. European Journal of International Law 16: 
369–408. 
LAWSON, ROBERT J., MARK GWOZDECKY, JILL SINCLAIR, AND RALPH LYSYSHYN. (1998) The 
Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines. In To 
Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines, edited by Maxwell A. 
Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian J. Tomlin. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
MALENIC, MARINA. (2008) Vice Chief Tells Senator Army Will Not Procure Victim-Activated 
Spider. Inside the Army. 
MASLEN, STUART. (2005) 1 Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties: The Convention on the  
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1994) The False Promise of International Institutions. International 
Security 19: 5–49. 
MORGAN, MATTHEW J. (2002) A New Kellogg-Briand Mentality? The Anti-Personnel Landmine 
Ban. Small Wars and Insurgencies 13: 97–110. 
DE NEVERS, RENEE. (2007) Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm 
Enforcement. International Studies Review 9: 53–80. 
 NORRLOF, CARLA. (2010) America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International 
Cooperation. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10385760. (Accessed September 27, 2013). 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (2014) Statement at the Third Review Conference, by Madame 
Dong Zhihua, Counsellor, Dept of Arms Control and Disarmament, MFA China. 
Available at: http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-
RC3/friday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_China.pdf. (Accessed October 17, 2014). 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (2003) Statement of the Chinese Observer Delegation. Available 
at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-statesparties/ 5msp/daily-
summaries-and-statements/update-day-5/. (Accessed March 11, 2014). 
PERCY, SARAH V. (2007) Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law. International Organization 61: 
367–397. 
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA. (2012) Annual Report in Accordance with 
Article 13, Paragraph 4 of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. Geneva. Available at: 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/AD0E2FD6365586DFC12579D3
00589B45/$file/United_States_APII_NAR_30_March_2012.pdf. (Accessed October 17, 
2014). 
PRICE, RICHARD. (2006) Detecting Ideas and Their Effects. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodwin and Charles Tilly. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
PRICE, RICHARD. (2004a) Emerging Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines. In The 
Politics of International Law, edited by Christian Reus-Smit. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
PRICE, RICHARD. (2004b) Hegemony and Multilateralism. International Journal 60: 129–150. 
PRICE, RICHARD. (1998) Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land 
Mines. International Organization 52: 613–644. 
PRICE, RICHARD. (2003) Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics. World 
Politics 55: 579–606. 
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. (1997) Statement by Angola. 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA. (2002) Statement of Croatia. Available at: 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/4msp/daily-
summaries-and-statements/update-day-2/. (Accessed March 10, 2014). 
  
REPUBLIC OF FINLAND. (2002) Statement by Finland. Available at: 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/4msp/daily-
summaries-and-statements/update-day-3/. (Accessed March 10, 2014). 
REPUBLIC OF INDIA. (2014) Statement by India. Available at: 
http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-
RC3/friday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_India.pdf. (Accessed July 15, 2014). 
REPUBLIC OF POLAND. (2001) Statement on Behalf of Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN. (2011) Statement by Her Excellency Grace Datiro, Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-
states-parties/11msp/what-happened/day-2-monday-28-november/statements/. (Accessed 
March 10, 2014). 
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN. (2001) Statement of the Republic of Sudan. 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY. (2013) Statement by Turkey on Compliance. Available at: 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-
GS/4_COMPLIANCE_-Turkey.pdf. (Accessed September 26, 2014). 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY. (2007) Statement on Universalizing the Convention (Agenda Item 11.A). 
Available at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-
parties/8msp/what-happened/day-1-sunday-18-november/. (Accessed July 23, 2012). 
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN. (2013) Yemen Response to AP Mines Use in Yemen during 2011. 
Available at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-
may13/Speeches-GS/4_COMPLIANCE_-_Yemen.pdf. (Accessed September 26, 2014). 
REUS-SMIT, CHRISTIAN. (2011) Obligation through Practice. International Theory 3: 339–347. 
REUS-SMIT, CHRISTIAN. (2003) Politics and International Legal Obligation. European Journal of 
International Relations 9: 591–625. 
REUS-SMIT, CHRISTIAN. (1997) The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the 
Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International Organization 51: 555–589. 
REUS-SMIT, CHRISTIAN, Ed. (2004a) The Politics of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
REUS-SMIT, CHRISTIAN. (2004b) The Politics of International Law. In The Politics of 
International Law, edited by Christian Reus-Smit. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
RISSE, THOMAS, STEPHEN C. ROPP, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, Eds. (2013) The Persistent Power of 
Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 RISSE, THOMAS, STEPHEN C. ROPP, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, Eds. (1999) The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
RUTHERFORD, KENNETH. (1999) The Hague and Ottawa Conventions a Model for Future 
Weapon Ban Regimes? The Nonproliferation Review 6: 36–50. 
SANDHOLTZ, WAYNE, AND KENDALL STILES. (2008) International Norms and Cycles of Change. 
New York: Oxford University Press, USA. 
SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CCW. (2001) Final Declaration. 
Geneva: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/602/61/IMG/G0260261.pdf?OpenElement. (Accessed 
July 10, 2014). 
SEYMOUR, LEE J. M. (2014) Let’s Bullshit! Arguing, Bargaining and Dissembling over Darfur. 
European Journal of International Relations 20: 571–595. 
SMITH-CANNOY, HEATHER. (2012) Insincere Commitments: Human Rights Treaties, Abusive 
States, and Citizen Activism. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTIPERSONNEL MINE BAN TREATY. (2014) Review of the Operation 
and Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 2010-2014. Maputo, 
Mozambique. Available at: http://www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-
RC3/3RC-Draft-review-Convention.pdf. (Accessed October 9, 2014). 
VON STEIN, JANA. (2005) Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty 
Compliance. American Political Science Review 99: 611–622. 
THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA. (2004) Statement by H.E. Mr. Ali M. 
Gedi, The Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. 
THOMPSON, ALEXANDER. (2006) Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of 
Information Transmission. International Organization 60: 1–34. 
THOMPSON, ALEXANDER. (2009) The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the 
Sanctioners’dilemma. International Theory 1: 307–321. 
UKRAINE. (2003) Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine. Available at: 
http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/5MSP/update_day2/Ukra
ine_5MSP_16_Sept_2003.pdf. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (1997) Anti-Personnel Landmines: Seeking Support for U.S. 
Positions at Oslo Conference. 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (2014) FACT SHEET: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine 
Policy. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-
changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy. (Accessed October 17, 2014). 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (1994) Remarks by President William Clinton. Available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49152&st=united+nations&st1. 
(Accessed October 17, 2014). 
VINES, ALEX. (1998) The Crisis of Anti-Personnel Mines. In To Walk Without Fear: The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines, edited by Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and 
Brian W. Tomlin. Toronto; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
WARMINGTON, VALERIE, AND CELINA TUTTLE. (1998) The Canadian Campaign. In To Walk 
Without Fear: The Global  Movement to Ban Landmines, edited by Maxwell A. 
Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin. Toronto; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
WENDT, ALEXANDER. (1992) Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics. International Organization 46: 391–425. 
WIGHT, MARTIN. (2004) Power Politics. edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad. New 
York; London: Continuum: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
WOHLFORTH, WILLIAM C. (2012) US Leadership and the Limits of International Institutional 
Change. International Journal 62: 415–421. 
 
  
 Notes  
                                                 
1 Author’s Note: I thank Gregorio Bettiza, Nehal Bhuta, Michael Byers, Katharina Coleman, 
Richard Price, Jeni Whalan, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and critiques. I 
am also indebted to the many diplomats and civil society practitioners who shared their insights 
during the course of this research. While they are not represented by name here, their views 
greatly contributed to my understanding of the Mine Ban regime. The standard disclaimer 
applies. Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2014 ISA Convention in Toronto 
and the 2014 Max Weber Fellows Conference at the European University Institute in Florence, 
Italy. I gratefully acknowledge financial and institutional support from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Department of Politics at the University of British 
Columbia, the Max Weber Programme at the European University Institute, and the Department 
of Politics and International Relations and Nuffield College, Oxford. 
2 By “great powers” I mean the limited group of states possessing the material resources and 
political interests to seriously influence the operation and order of the international system 
(Wight 2004:41–53; Hurrell 2006:1–2). For the present purposes, I am particularly concerned 
with current or (re)emerging powers that also reject the key institutional features in question, 
namely China, India, Russia and (most especially) the United States (Hurrell 2006; Destradi 
2010). 
3 Bolton and Nash (Bolton and Nash 2010:173) define middle powers as “relatively wealthy, 
small to medium-sized states, with no nuclear weapons and no permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council.” Prominent examples include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and Sweden. 
Following Price (Price 2003:580), I adopt a broad definition of transnational civil society as 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
“self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders 
in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest.” In the context of this study this most 
especially encompasses non-governmental organizations, private individuals (such as lawyers, 
aid workers, and peace activists), and inter-governmental organizations such the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
4 Of course, the transition to a legal form may not necessarily strengthen an underlying social 
norm. Sarah Percy (Percy 2007) has argued, for example, that the greater precision provided by 
international law concerning mercenaries generated loopholes that states could exploit in 
avoiding their binding commitments. Indeed, legal codification does not guarantee an obvious 
consensus over the meaning of rules, as international law frequently contains extensive 
ambiguity. However, the transition to a legal setting channels subsequent debates via particular 
argumentative forms that shape subsequent diplomacy and behaviour. 
5 I understand “legalization” as “the dynamic process through which law changes and develops, 
whereas law consists of the rules and institutions that result from the cumulation of legalization 
at any point in time.” (Abbott and Snidal 2013:34) 
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Ottawa, December 3, 1997. 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages. I focus 
principally on the prohibition concerning mine use; this is a pragmatic decision designed to 
retain the scope of inquiry within manageable limits, and does not imply a judgement regarding 
the relative merits of other treaty goals. 
7 It is estimated that between two-and-a-half and four million antipersonnel mines were 
emplaced annually in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. At the time of the MBT’s negotiation, over 
                                                                                                                                                              
70 countries were infested with a total of 60-70 million mines (Department of State, United 
States of America 1998; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1999:4–5). Generally, see 
(Vines 1998). 
8 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II to the 1980 CCW). 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/575. Article 5(2) of the treaty permits the use of AP landmines 
that contain self-destruct or self-deactivation mechanisms, or in instances where the minefields 
are fenced and actively patrolled. 
9 US demands were “presented in a take-it-or-leave-it package consisting of five interlocking 
components: exception for landmine use in Korea; deferral of the treaty's entry-into-force date; 
changes in the definition of an anti-personnel landmine [to exclude anti-tampering devices on US 
anti-tank mines]; more intensive verification measures; and a withdrawal clause from the treaty 
in cases of national emergency.” (Rutherford 1999:40) 
10 As of October 2014. See http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=575&ps=P.  
11 The most frequent users of AP mines since 1998 are Myanmar, Nepal (until 2006), Russia 
(until 2009), and Syria. Angola, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal are known to 
have used AP mines as signatories to the MBT, but the actions in all cases ceased in advance of 
full membership. 
12 China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
the United States, and Vietnam.  
13 Data on inter-state and intra-state conflicts is summarized in (Human Security Report Project 
2013). 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and 
Zimbabwe. 
15 Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Niger, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Timor-Leste. 
16 Interviews with Finnish and Polish diplomats, and representatives of the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and MBT Implementation Support Unit. Geneva, October 2009 
and December 2010.  
17 This is especially evident in recent debates concerning non-compliance in the use of AP mines 
and in missed deadlines for stockpile destruction. Records of statements at MBT meetings can be 
found at http://www.apminebanconvention.org/.  
18 Including Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Republic of Korea, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation.  
19 China, Egypt, Israel, United States. 
20 China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United States. 
21 President Clinton signed the Mine Ban Treaty on his final day in office, but advised his 
successor not to seek Senate ratification unless fundamental US concerns were addressed. 
22 As of January 2011, all persistent mines have been withdrawn from active inventories and 
transferred for destruction (Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United 
Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva 2012). 
